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Introduction. Contextualizing and
Interpreting the 15th Lok Sabha
Elections
Balveer Arora and Stéphanie Tawa Lama-Rewal
1 Most  of  the  papers  presented  in  this  special  issue  of  SAMAJ  are  the  outcome  of  a
workshop organised by the Centre de Sciences Humaines in New Delhi in July 2009. By
then the results of the 2009 general elections had been largely commented upon already.
The workshop was therefore not meant to discuss electoral results per se, but rather to
have  specialists  discuss  papers  that  considered  elections  as  an  analyzer  of  political
dynamics that most authors usually studied in more ordinary times.1 As Butler, Lahiri and
Roy (1995: 5) put it, ‘every election is a potential turning point in history and deserves a
full  study as  a  contemporary event,  an opportunity  to  observe politicians  and party
organizations at full stretch, to examine the influence of press and broadcasting, to assess
the involvement of ordinary citizens’.
2 Indeed reading election studies over time shows how elections serve as landmarks in the
analysis  of  India’s  political  system.2 Each  major  electoral  consultation  offers  an
opportunity to produce interpretations which also contribute to the evolution of  the
polity. Thus the Fourth election (1967) marked the end of Congress dominance in the
states; the Eighth election (1977) marked the beginning of the end of Congress dominance
at the Centre; the Tenth (1996) and more decisively the Twelfth elections (1998) signaled
the opening of the era of coalitions. Elections, as events, crystallize ongoing processes and
highlight some major shifts even while they obliterate others.
3 The macro-perspective chosen by most authors in this issue aims to contextualize the 15th
elections to the Lok Sabha, i.e. the lower chamber of the Indian Parliament, with a view to
highlighting  this  production  of  interpretations  of  the  vote,  by  different  actors,  for
different publics, with different objectives.
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The interpretation of election results by political
actors
4 One possible approach is to view elections from the way in which election results, once
declared, are interpreted by the political actors themselves. The search for meaning in
the analysis of electoral results and trends relies heavily on the interpretation of the
intentions of voters, both before and after the elections. Those who seek to understand
these intentions are, first and foremost, the candidates themselves, both the winners and
the losers. For the winners, staying ahead requires an accurate assessment of where their
strengths lie,  while for those who failed to make it,  it  is  important to have clues on
constituencies  that  can be won over.  There are  in addition interpretations based on
surveys,  both  pre-  and  post-poll.3 With  all  their  analytical  sophistication,  the
interpretation  of  results  remains  problematic  in  terms  of  attributing  rationality  or
irrationality to it.4
5 Winning parties have their own networks of political intelligence, and have access to the
interpretations of professional analysts too. Their very survival depends on an accurate
assessment and interpretation of the mandate they have received from their support
base, since the vocation of a ruling party is to remain in power till the next round, and
beyond.
6 The party which loses power also proceeds to introspect on the reasons for its defeat in
order to work out ways of coming back to power. This introspection is generally based on
inputs from states where they did well and those where they fared poorly, in order to
evolve a winning strategy for the next round. Finally, for the single-state and multi-state
parties which find themselves in the pool of coalition partners and allies, they have to
often decide whether they situate themselves in the government or with the opposition
camp till the next round of consultations, whether state or national.5 These calculations
are complex, for they must interpret the result in their own state and work out strategies
for  leveraging  central  ties  without  endangering  their  own primary  objective  i.e.  the
capture of power in the state.
7 Thus one approach to contextualizing the Lok Sabha elections is to view them within the
framework of  inter-party relations in a multi-level  federal  polity,  and to assess their
impact  on  public  policy  processes  in  the  intervening  periods.  It  is  evident  that  the
assessments and interpretations of electoral mandates by parties, particularly those in
power,  have  a  direct  bearing  on  public  policy  choices.  This  is  equally  applicable  to
opposition parties and the policies they combat. More often than not,  it  is a delicate
balancing act of extracting political mileage from visibly popular welfare policies while
performing, at the same time, the role of the opposition, i.e. to oppose.6
8 Government-opposition  relations  are  crucial  to  understanding  political  processes  in
parliamentary democracies. In a federal polity, this relationship runs concurrently at two
levels,  with  calendars  that  criss-cross  ever  since  national  and  state  elections  were
delinked in 1971-72.7 Federal coalitions consist of concentric circles and the calculations
that enter into their construction are heavily influenced by the electoral calendar and
compulsions of the partners and allies in each of the circles.
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State goals, federal imperatives
9 In decoding the mandate that flows from the 2009 consultation, we need to contextualize
the results at two levels of the federal polity, the national and the state, and attempt to
define the nature of the link between the two. One way of doing this is to first situate the
15th Lok Sabha elections in terms of the defining trends of the last two decades, since the
convincing defeat of the Congress in 1989. Clues to the links between the levels of the
dual federal polity can emerge by exploring the ways in which elections at the state level
have been linked to or delinked from the Lok Sabha electoral mandates. The responses of
federal coalitions, which have their own internal logic, to the continuing challenge of the
electoral  consultations  calendar  are  equally  instructive.  Finally,  empirical  data  on
decision  making  in  federal  coalitions  reveals  that  the  systemic  innovations  first
introduced by the BJP-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) government (1999-2004)
and  further  developed  by  the  first  Congress-led  United  Progressive  Alliance  (UPA)
government  (2004-09)  ensure  that  constituency  concerns  of  coalition  members  are
adequately  addressed  and thus  play  an  important  role  in  maintaining  governmental
stability.8
10 While  movements  and  parties  have  distinct  and  often  identifiable  social  roots,  they
respond to institutional parameters in devising their electoral tactics and strategies. Ever
since the debate on the relative weight to be attached to these two elements between
Maurice Duverger (1954) and Georges Lavau (1955) in the 1950s, political science has tried
to grapple with this issue. The fragmentation of party systems usually has clear social
roots, and in the case of India, given the caste configuration and cultural pluralism of the
polity,  their  political  articulation  is  conditioned,  and  frequently  determined,  by  the
structure of electoral opportunities of the multilevel federal polity. In these calculations,
the fact that the federal polity is centralized in its distribution of power and resources
further weighs on the choices made.
11 One of the durable trends of the period under study is the steady increase in the number
of single-state and multi-state parties as a result of the federalization of the party system.
9 One can analytically distinguish between the first generation state parties which were
born in the pre-independence era or under the Congress dominance phase, from the state
parties that came into being in the subsequent phase. While the most prominent ones
were  primarily  based  on  territorial  identity  politics,  those  based  on  ideological
specificities  were  no  less  significant  (Tirimagni-Hurtig  &  Arora  1972).10 The  second
generation of state parties resulted from the gradual splintering and eventual collapse of
the  Congress  during  its  1969-1977  hyper-centralization  phase  and  the  subsequent
implosion  of  the  short-lived  Janata  alternative.11 These  single-state  and  multi-state
parties  constitute  the  building  blocks  of  federal  coalitions  since  the  1996  elections
witnessed a sharp decline in the Congress seat share and the BJP was totally unprepared
for occupying the political space so vacated. As the following tables show, the popularity
of single-state and multi-state parties remains undiminished.12
 
Table 1. Distribution of Lok Sabha Seats between All-India and State Parties 1996-2009
 11LS:1996 12LS:1998 13LS:1999 14LS:2004 15LS:2009
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 % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats % Seats
All-India Parties
Congress 25.8 26.0 21.0 26.7 37.9
BJP 29.6 33.5 33.5 25.4 21.4
Sub Total INC+BJP 55.4 59.5 54.5 52.1 59.3
State Parties
Multi-state parties* 18.8 11.8 13.3 14.9. 9.9
Single-State  parties  &
Independents. 
25.8 28.7 32.2 33.0 30.8
Sub Total State Parties 44.6 40.5 45.5 47.9 40.7
Grand Total 100 100 100 100 100
 
Table 2. Division of Vote Share in the Lok Sabha between All-India and State Parties 1996-2009 













Congress 28.80 25.82 28.30 26.53 28.52
BJP 20.29 25.59 23.75 22.16 18.84
Sub Total INC+BJP 49.09 51.41 52.05 48.59 47.36
State Parties
Multi-state parties* 22.72 19.36 20.11 16.61 16.24
Single-State  parties  and
Independents 
28.19 29.23 27.84 34.80 36.40
Sub Total State Parties 50.91 48.59 47.95 51.41 52.64
Grand Total 100 100 100 100 100
Source for Tables 1 & 2: Election Commission of India (http://eci.nic.in)
*Multi-state parties are the smaller parties recognized as ‘national’ by the Election
Commission in successive elections. In 2009 these were CPM, CPI, BSP, RJD, and NCP.
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12 Two immediate observations impose themselves from even a cursory reading of these
tables: (a) the ratio of seats won by the all-India parties in relation to the state parties is
similar in 2009 to the 1998 level;  and (b) the drop in their combined vote share is a
continuing trend, the lowest among all five elections. This is, on the face of it, not ‘a
radical  shift  in  the  social  basis  of  political  power’  that  the  2004  electoral  outcome
appeared to be at first glance.13 This said, the working of the First Passed the Post (FPTP)
electoral system is such that, with all these limitations, the votes did translate into a
comfortable win for the Congress, and gave it the option of being able to pick and choose
its coalition partners.14
13 While there is no authoritative indication of the BJP reading of its dismal performance,
the Congress has put forward its own interpretation of why it won.15 It sees the renewal of
its mandate as a vindication of the policy architecture of inclusion it built up during its
first term in office. ‘It is a mandate for inclusive growth, equitable development and a
secular and plural India.’16 It also views the mandate as a desire for peace and stability,
and places internal security as the first priority of the new government.
14 If one has to explain the resurgence of the Congress in what appeared to be at one stage a
‘post-Congress  polity’,  one  also  has  to  explain  what  happened to  the  other  pillar  of
conventional  wisdom:  the  anti-incumbency  vote.  The  hypothesis  that  deserves  to  be
further tested is that it held good during periods of poor economic growth and was a
reflection of the desperation of the electorate, willing to try any other option available to
see if it delivered any better living conditions. The recent trend of renewal of election
mandates is  interpreted by the winning parties  as  an endorsement of  their  effective
delivery  of  welfare  policies.17 Effective  economic  policy  in  the  electoral  context  is
primarily seen as the ability of governments to keep prices in check and to ensure basic
necessities. Political mileage for other achievements such as the provision of jobs and
welfare benefits is keenly contested between central and state governments. As Table 3
shows, thirty single-state parties and nine independents managed to find a place in the
Lok Sabha.
 








Indian National Congress 206 37.94 All India vote share 28.52%
Bharatiya Janata Party 116 21.36 All India vote share 18.83%
Total All-India Parties (2) 322 59.30 Combined vote share 47.35%
Multi-State  Parties/ECI
Recognized National
  (Vote share % in brackets)
Bahujan Samaj Party 21 4.99 U.P. + (6.17)
Communist Party of India 4 0.74 W. Bengal, Kerala + (1.43)
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Communist  Party  of  India
(Marxist)
16 2.95 W. Bengal, Kerala, Tripura (5.34)
Nationalist Congress Party 9 1.66 Maharashtra, Meghalaya (2.04)
Rashtriya Janata Dal 4 0.74 Bihar (1.27)
Total  Multi-State/  ECI
Recognized National (5)
54 9.94 Total Vote share 16.26
State Parties ECI Recognized
All  India  Anna  Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam
9 1.66 Tamil Nadu (1.67)
All India Forward Bloc 2 0.37 West Bengal (0.32)
All India Trinamool Congress 19 3.50 West Bengal (3.20)
Asom Gana Parishad 1 0.18 Assam (0.43)
Assam United Democratic Front 1 0.18 Assam (NA)
Biju Janata Dal 14 2.58 Orissa (1.59)
Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam 18 3.31 Tamil Nadu (1.83)
Jammu  &  Kashmir  National
Conference
3 0.55 J&K (0.12)
Janata Dal (Secular) 3 0.55 Karnataka (0.82)
Janata Dal (United) 20 3.68 Bihar(1.52)
Jharkhand Mukti Morcha 2 0.37 Jharkhand (0.40)
Kerala Congress (M) 1 0.18 Kerala (0.08)
Marumalarchi  Dravida
Munnetra Kazhagam
1 0.18 Tamil Nadu (NA)
Muslim  League  Kerala  State
Committee
2 0.37 Kerala(0.21)
Nagaland Peoples Front 1 0.18 Nagaland (NA)
Revolutionary Socialist Party 2 0.37 West Bengal (0.38)
Samajwadi Party 23 4.24 Uttar Pradesh (3.43)
Shiromani Akali Dal 4 0.74 Punjab (0.96)
Shiv Sena 11 2.03 Maharashtra (1.55)
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Sikkim Democratic Front 1 0.18 Sikkim (0.04)
Telangana Rashtra Samithi 2 0.37 Andhra Pradesh (0.62)
Telugu Desam 6 1.10 Andhra Pradesh (2.51)
Total Single State ECI Recognized
(22) 
146 26.89  
ECI Unrecognized State Parties
All  India  Majlis-E-Ittehadul
Muslimeen
1 0.18 Andhra Pradesh
Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi 1 0.18 Maharashtra
Bodaland Peoples Front 1 0.18 Assam
Haryana  Janhit  Congress
(BhajanLal)
1 0.18 Haryana
Jharkhand  Vikas  Morcha
(Prajatantrik)
1 0.18 Jharkhand
Rashtriya Lok Dal 5 0.92 Uttar Pradesh
Swabhimani Paksha 1 0.18 Maharashtra
Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch 1 0.18 Tamil Nadu
Independents 9 1.66
Bihar(2),  Jharkhand(2),  J&K,  Maharashtra
,  Rajasthan,  Uttar  Pradesh,  W.  Bengal  (1
each)
Total  ECI  Unrecognized  Single
State  Parties  (8)  +  Independents
(9)
21 3.87
Total  seat  share  of  multi-state  and
single  state  parties  +  independents  :
40.7%
GRAND TOTAL 543 100%  
Source: Compiled from Election Commission of India (Press Information Bureau , http://
www.pib.nic.in/elections2009) and Palshikar (2009). The assistance of K.K.Kailash in tabulating
electoral data is gratefully acknowledged.
15 Going further, it is to be noted that there were only 17 single-state and multi-state parties
which  crossed  the  0.5%  threshold  of  significance  in  terms  of  the  number  of  seats
obtained, i.e. 3 seats. Some state parties obtained a significant share of votes—enough to
influence electoral outcomes but insufficient to obtain seats for them. Notable among
them  were  the  Maharashtra  Navanirman  Sena  (MNS),  Desiya  Murpokku  Dravida
Kazhagam (DMDK) and the Praja Rajyam Party (PRP).18
16 The link between state and national elections is at the core of discussions on interpreting
mandates.  Yogendra Yadav suggests  that  the principal  choices are made in the state
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assembly elections and the national consultation is increasingly ‘derivative’  (Yadav &
Palshikar 2009: 55).19 The relevance of state goals to the participation of parties in federal
coalitions is undoubtedly a major element of this analysis. For example, a surprisingly
large  proportion  of  parties  which  joined  the  NDA  in  2009  were  in  the  role  of  the
opposition at the state level, and were clearly interested in leveraging their participation
to capture power in the state elections. The policy orientations and choices of federal
coalitions are thus influenced by the goals of coalition members, whose horizons are in
turn determined by the electoral cycles in their respective states.
17 The shift towards a bi-nodal system and the logic of federal coalitions has clear analytical
implications. How is a bi-nodal system different from a bi-polar one? The distinction is,
we argue,  that  bipolarity implies the existence of  two antipodal  forces,  diametrically
opposite, at either end of the spectrum. What we observe however is the existence of two
and occasionally  three principal  nodes around which state parties  tend to cluster  in
varying formations.  While  there are some constants  around each node,  there is also
significant movement of parties to intermediate positions and in some cases between
nodes.20 As  a  recent  study  observes,  ‘the  Indian  party  system  has  made  a  definite
transition from the days of one-party dominance to a multi-party system in which the
multiplicity exists more at the national than at the state level and is increasingly bound
in a bi-nodal alliance system’ (Lokniti 2008: 85).
18 The electoral strategies of the two major parties in a bi-nodal system and the emergence
of  federal  coalitions  are  strikingly  evident  in  the  number  of  candidates  fielded  in
successive Lok Sabha elections. When the BJP switched from the cobbling together of a
post-electoral majority strategy (1998) to a conscious coalition-centric strategy (1999) the
number of candidates it fielded dropped. Its attempts at expanding and consolidating its
electoral  base  beyond its  traditional  bastions  explain the subsequent  increase  in  the
number of candidates fielded. In the case of the Congress, there is a significant increase in
2009 primarily due to the reassertion strategy adopted in the key states of Uttar Pradesh
and Bihar.
 
Table 4. Lok Sabha Seats Contested by the INC and BJP 1996-2009
 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009
INC 529 477 453 417 440
BJP 471 388 339 364 433
Source: Election Commission of India http://eci.nic.in
Note: The BSP became the party to contest the largest number of seats in 2009: 500. In earlier
elections, it fielded: 251 in 1998, 225 in 1999, and 435 in 2004.
19 In order to analyze the linkage between state goals and federal imperatives, the ways in
which federal coalitions have attempted to reconcile different priorities in their decision-
making processes is instructive. As earlier noted, the Group of Ministers (GoM) and the
Empowered Group of Ministers (EGoM) mechanisms constitute an interesting device for
understanding the relationship between the two levels of electoral consultations. The
UPA-I government used this device extensively and effectively to ensure participation of
coalition partners in key policy decisions.21
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20 Thus, from the public policy viewpoint, the electoral calendar of state assemblies (shown
in Table 5) is clearly of particular relevance. The mandates are linked even if the elections
are  de-linked.  The  consolidation  of  power  at  the  national  level  passes  through  the
decimation of challengers and opponents at the state level. Hence the interpretation of
the 2009 mandate by the Congress as one for effective delivery of welfare benefits to the
poor attempts to cut across traditional vote bank boundaries.22
 
Table 5: Electoral calendar for renewal of 23 State Assemblies (2009-2013)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Maharashtra Bihar Assam Uttar Pradesh Karnataka
Andhra* Kerala Uttarakhand Madhya Pradesh.
Orissa* Tamil Nadu Gujarat Chattisgarh
Sikkim* West Bengal Punjab Rajasthan
Haryana Puducherry Goa Himachal Pradesh.
Jharkhand   Delhi
Source: Compiled on the basis of dates on which the last elections were held, on the assumption that
the assemblies are not prematurely dissolved. http://eci.nic.in 
Notes:
1.* Elections held along with 15th LS Polls in May. Others held in Oct-Dec 2009.
2. Jammu & Kashmir Assembly has a six year term and will be up for re-election in 2014. Six north-
eastern states (Nagaland, Mizoram, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, and Arunachal) have not been
included due to data uncertainties.
21 The significance of this calendar is related to the concentric circles of federal coalitions.
The  first  circle  comprises  the  coalition  maker,  the  second  consists  of  key  coalition
partners, the third of minor coalition partners and the fourth of parties, whether pre or
post election allies, who have volunteered their support, conditionally or unconditionally,
but are not part of the coalition. The electoral compulsions of the first circle have direct
policy  implications  in  terms  of  the  prioritization  of  agenda  items  in  a  dual-horizon
perspective. The first horizon is that of the state election, whereas the second is the
objective  of  maintaining  the  majority  for  the  full  term  of  the  mandate.23 Thus  the
electoral  horizons  of  the  second  circle  of  key  partners  enter  into  the  picture.  For
example, two major pieces of economic reform legislation which cleared the 14th Lok
Sabha but lapsed with its dissolution since the Rajya Sabha failed to approve them. They
have been reintroduced in the 15th Lok Sabha,  but are unlikely to be processed very
rapidly till the West Bengal electoral horizon clears.24 
22 The majoritarian temptation is ever present in coalitions, but in a bi-nodal federal polity
it takes on critical dimensions. While it is natural for parties with a vocation to capture
power at the national level to seek an absolute majority by themselves, the federalization
of the party system might well manifest a voter desire to loosen the grip of majoritarian
parties and to safeguard state autonomy.
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The contributors
23 Two  papers  in  this  special  issue  further  discuss  the  possible  interpretations  and
implications of the 2009 Lok Sabha elections in terms of relationships between the Centre
and the states. C. Jaffrelot and G. Verniers analyze the 2009 electoral results with a view
to testing two hypotheses that have been largely discussed lately: (i) the hypothesis of the
re-centralization of the political scene, after a series of elections that seemed, on the
contrary, to manifest the increasing importance of the states as decisive political arenas;
and (ii) the hypothesis of the ethnicization of political parties. They conclude that the
regionalization of politics is continuing, and that the coalition era is far from over.
24 In a more theoretical perspective, C. Robin and B. Lefebvre situate this latest round of
elections  in  the  international  literature  on  coalition  formation;  they  analyze  the
dynamics of coalition formation since the emergence of the NDA in the late 1990s, with a
focus on a largely overlooked, and yet critical aspect:  that of pre-electoral coalitions.
Their  study  relies  on  a  geographical  methodology  that  suggests  that  the  contrasted
regional presence of the two coalition leaders, the Congress and the BJP, is a major factor
in their respective success as such.
25 R. Chowdhury’s paper then allows us to zoom in on the interplay between state and
national politics, with a case study of Jammu and Kashmir focusing on the intertwining of
mainstream and  separatist  strategy  and  practice  in  that  state,  which  has  also  been
governed by coalition governments for the past few years. The paper also draws attention
to the continued significance of identity politics, which sustains state parties in many
parts  of  the  country:  Telangana,  Bodoland,  Gorkhaland,  Jharkhand  and  most  of  the
northeastern states.
26 Finally, S. Tawa Lama-Rewal reflects on the conditions of production of election studies in
India.  Her critical review of this literature underlines the variety of perspectives and
methodologies  that  can  be,  and  have  been,  used  in  studying  elections.  She  draws
attention to the important role of the media in funding and publicizing a major brand of
election  studies,  i.e.  survey  research.  She  also  emphasizes  the  significant,  but  today
largely under-represented,  contribution of  anthropology to the understanding of  this
rich phenomenon. Her paper argues that election studies are really in between science
and politics, which makes it all the more necessary to contextualize them—and this is
precisely what this issue of SAMAJ is aiming at.
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NOTES
1. Workshop ‘Elections 2009’ held at the India International Centre, New Delhi with the support
of the Centre de Sciences Humaines, on 31st July 2009. We would like to record our thanks to all
the  paper  presenters,  discussants  and  sessions  chairs  who  contributed  to  the  very  lively
discussion.
2. But the same perusal also underlines the risk of hasty conclusions: for instance Electoral Studies
stated that ‘the 1999 general election appears to have put an end to Sonia Gandhi’s short-lived
political career’ (Saez 2001).
3. In  the introduction to the 2004 National  Election Study (NES)  of  Lokniti,  Yogendra Yadav
admitted,  ‘The  outcome of  the  14th general  elections  to  the  Lok  Sabha  constitutes  a  puzzle,
something that continues to elude political actors, analysts and the public even six months after
[the  results…]  The  mandate  of  the  election  is  not  clear  even  today.  Neither  the  political
establishment  nor  the  knowledge  industry  has  been  able  to  forge  anything  like  a  shared
consensus regarding the message of this general election.’  (Lokniti team 2004: 5373). See also
Shastri et al (2009).
4. Thus, is voting driven by anti-incumbency or by caste loyalty rational or irrational? American
historian Rick Shenkman (author of Just How Stupid Are We?) argues that ‘‘throw the bums out’
may not be a sophisticated response to adversity but it is a rational one.’ Cited in Bartels 2008: 50.
5. It  is  not that political actors themselves always find it  easy to interpret the results which
concern them in the first instance. Speaking of the BJP’s assessment of its electoral reverses in
the last two elections, Yashwant Sinha, a prominent leader of the party, said of the 2004 election
‘we believe we lost accidentally.’ (Conversation with Shekhar Gupta ‘Walk the Talk’, Indian Express
, 27 July 2009). 
6. In the interpretation of mandates by political parties, a crucial element of course is the degree
of  democratic  functioning  within  the  party  and  the  possibilities  for  a  free  flow  of  political
intelligence from the constituency to  the leadership levels.  Frequently,  factions  and coteries
impede this flow, with obvious consequences for sound decisions.
7. On 27 December 1970, Indira Gandhi prematurely dissolved the Lok Sabha elected in 1967 and
won handsomely the February 1971 elections. Following her spectacular foreign policy initiative
thereafter which led to the creation of Bangladesh in December 1971, she repeated her electoral
success in the state assembly polls held in March 1972 in most states.
8. Thus, the Group of Ministers mechanism was devised to meet needs generated by coalitional
power-sharing which could not be met by the traditional inter-ministerial coordination devices.
Also, leadership of the coalition in Parliament was delinked from leadership of the party in the
two Houses of Parliament by the UPA, a practice which was subsequently adopted by the NDA. 
9. We prefer the term ‘federalization’ to the more frequently used ‘fragmentation’, because the
latter captures the reality without offering any explanation for the occurrence. We believe that
there is a pattern along which the fragmentation takes place, a ‘method in the madness’ which
goes beyond personality issues and ego clashes. As the number of state assemblies has grown, so
has the number of single – state parties, a process which began with the reorganization of states
and has continued since. The federalization of the party system denotes its restructuring, during
the post-Congress dominance phase,  along the fault-lines of the federal  polity.  Parties rarely
succeed in transcending state boundaries and achieving multi-state social mobilization.
10. Prominent among the identity-based parties which still survive, with their off-shoots and
avatars, are the Muslim League, the Shiromani Akali Dal, the Dravida Munnettra Kazhagam, the
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Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, and parties of Jharkhand, Nagaland, Meghalaya, Goa, and
Telangana. The ideological specificity group comprises Left parties such as the Forward Bloc, the
Revolutionary Socialist Party, the Peasants and Workers Party.
11. In this category we would include the Janata Dals (JDU, JDS, BJD, RJD), the Rashtriya Lok Dal,
Samajwadi Party, Bahujan Samaj Party, and the three major ‘regionalist’ parties to emerge during
this phase, the Shiv Sena, the Asom Gana Parishad and the Telugu Desam Party. See K.C.Suri,
‘Telugu Desam Party’ and Suhas Palshikar, ‘Shiv Sena’ in DeSouza and Sridharan (2006). 
12. We use  the  term multi-state  parties  to  designate  parties  recognized as  ‘national’  by  the
Election Commission from time to time, other than the two all-India parties. This device enables
consistent  comparison,  since  the  only  characteristic  these  parties  have  in  common  is  their
meeting the ECI mandated threshold of electoral significance in electoral results in two or three
states, and since the ‘national’ label is conferred on them or withdrawn on periodic review of
their  performance  after  each  election.  Thus  their  ‘national  party’  status  is  unstable  over
successive elections, whereas they remain state parties throughout. On the rapid response of the
BJP to the need for coalition building and the subsequent conversion of the Congress to this
strategy, see Arora (2000).
13. Yogendra Yadav in The Hindu, 20 May 2004. This assessment was subsequently corrected after
more detailed analysis, in Shastri et al. (2009).
14. Cf Palshikar (2009).
15. The BJP attempted introspection in Shimla in August 2009 on the basis of reports on the
states by centrally appointed observers. Successes were generally linked to good governance in
the states concerned whereas responsibility for failures remained vague and unassigned,  not
going beyond the ‘need to  avoid ideological  dilution or  confusion’  (Indian  Express,  11  August
2009). 
16. Speech by President Pratibha Patil at the opening session of the 15 th Lok Sabha, 4 June 2009
(Press Information Bureau, http://pib.nic.in accessed on 21 June 2009).
17. The state governments of Andhra Pradesh, Orissa and Sikkim were also voted back to power
in April-May 2009. Earlier, the Delhi government was voted in for an unprecedented third term.
18. The  PRP was  recognized  as  a  state  party  by  the  Election  Commission  of  India  after  the
declaration of results.
19. The comparison with national  assembly  elections  in  member  states  and elections  to  the
European parliament is interesting though somewhat misleading because the European Union is
not a centralized federation like the Indian Union.
20. The bi-nodal system of party competition at the national level corresponds perhaps closest to
the ‘Two Plus’ category defined by Yadav and Palshikar (2006: 83) for party competition at the
state level,  with the occasional rise of a third nodal party detaching itself  from the bi-nodal
framework and making efforts to pull together an alternative coalition. The CPM played such a
role in the 2009 elections. For an initial statement of the bi-nodal concept, see Arora (2003: 84).
21. Under the UPA-II  government,  the practice has resumed.  For example,  the GoM on food
security has all three major coalition partners: NCP, TMC and DMK. The inclusion of the first two
can no doubt be explained by their portfolios, Agriculture and Railways, but the inclusion of the
DMK minister of textiles is perhaps more reflective of the interest of the coalition partner in this
crucial area of public policy. On the multiple uses of GoMs under UPA-I, a preliminary assessment
can be seen in Arora and Kailash (2007).
22. On the significance of the expanding welfare role of the Indian state, see Nayar 2009. 
23. In the case of  the UPA II,  the Maharashtra,  Kerala,  Haryana and Uttar Pradesh elections
constitute clearly the first horizon which determines the schedule and pace of its economic and
social agenda.
24. The  Land  Acquisition  Amendment  Bill  and  the  Rehabilitation  and  Resettlement  Bill  are
crucial elements of the economic liberalization agenda of the UPA, which had managed to secure
Introduction. Contextualizing and Interpreting the 15th Lok Sabha Elections
South Asia Multidisciplinary Academic Journal, 3 | 2009
13
the support of the Left parties in the 14th Lok Sabha, but faces opposition from its new Bengal
ally, the Trinamool Congress. 
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